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What is the root cause of Africa’s current state of under-development? Is it the long 
history of slave trade, or the legacy of extractive colonial institutions, or the fallout of malaria? A 
precise answer still eludes us. This paper investigates the relative contribution of these historical 
factors using an instrumental variable approach. The results show that malaria matters the most 
and all other factors are statistically insignificant. The mechanism through which malaria impacts 
economic performance is demonstrated by a strong negative relationship between malaria and 
national savings and a two period overlapping generation model. The model shows that high 
malaria incidence adversely affects growth by increasing both mortality and morbidity. Increased 
mortality from malaria induces households to increase current consumption and save less for the 
future. Increased morbidity on the other hand adversely affects labour productivity. The 
combined impact of these two effects is a slowdown of capital accumulation and economic 
growth. 
Keywords: Malaria; Colonial Institutions; Slave Trade; Economic Development 
JEL classification: O11; O41; O57; N0 1. Introduction 
It is well known that Africa is falling behind the rest of the world in terms of economic 
wellbeing. Even though global poverty is declining due to rapid economic growth in India, China, 
and other parts of the world, Africa’s contribution to this decline is disappointing. Absolute 
poverty in many of the African nations is in fact rising (Sachs 2005). What is the fundamental 
cause behind this decline? Is there anything that we can do to arrest this decline and improve the 
situation for the African population? It is hard to think of any other question in development 
economics which has greater significance and relevance in the contemporary world than the 
abovementioned. 
Perhaps because of the nature of this question, there has been no shortage of research on 
this topic. Even though it is extremely difficult to summarize this voluminous and multifaceted 
literature, it is perhaps fair to say that three strands of thoughts stand out. 
The first is the disease view. According to this view, malaria and other infectious diseases 
have fatal as well as debilitating effects on the human population in Africa. It negatively 
influences productivity, savings, and investment and directly affects economic performance of the 
continent (Gallup and Sachs 2001; Bloom and Sachs 1998).
1 According to Bloom and Sachs 
(1998), the high incidence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa reduces the annual growth rate of the 
continent by 1.3% a year and eradication of malaria in the 1950s would have resulted into a 
doubling of per capita income from what exists today. 
The second is the colonial institutions view. According to this view, the persistent effect 
of colonial institutions can explain the huge differences in income across all ex-colonies 
                                                 
1 Batten and Martina (2005) make similar argument about the role of diseases. However, their work is based 
on a cross-country sample which includes countries from all continents.   
  1including Africa (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Rodrik et al. 2004, Bhattacharyya 2004).
2 The story goes 
as follows.  
Europeans resorted to different style of colonisation depending on the feasibility of 
settlement. In a tropical environment the settlers had to deal with the killer malaria and hence a 
high mortality rate. This prevented colonisers from settling in a tropical environment and they 
erected extractive institutions in these colonies. On the other hand, in temperate conditions 
European settlers felt more at home and decided to settle. In these colonies they erected 
institutions characterised by strong protection of private property and efficient enforcement of 
contracts. These institutions created by the colonizers have persisted over time and they continue 
to influence the economic performance of the colonies even long after independence. The 
settlement colonies with better institutions continue to perform well in the economic arena, 
whereas the non-settlement colonies with poor institutions continue to struggle. 
Finally, a third group of explanation relates to the economic impact of Africa’s 
engagement in slave trade. According to this view, Africa’s engagement in the slave trade caused 
massive depopulation of the continent over two centuries. This resulted into an implosion of the 
continent’s production possibility frontier and an unambiguous reduction in welfare. The secular 
decline in welfare continued over more than two centuries plunging the continent into economic 
backwardness (Gemery and Hogendorn 1979; Inikori 1992; and Manning 1981). 
Another theory within this group is proposed by Nunn (2004). He argues that Africa’s 
engagement in slave trade had a detrimental impact on the development of domestic institutions. 
                                                 
2 Earlier work by Easterly and Levine (1997) and Sachs and Warner (1997) also reports strong link between 
quality of state institutions and post-war growth (or the lack of it) in Africa. Easterly and Levine (1997) show that 
ethnic diversity in Africa has led to social polarization and the formation of several rival interest groups which 
increase the likelihood of selecting socially sub-optimal policies when an ethnic representative in the government fail 
to internalise the entire social cost of their rent seeking policies. Sachs and Warner (1997), on the other hand, stress 
on Africa’s lack of openness to international markets and unfavourable geography as other contributors to poor 
growth in addition to poor quality institutions.   
 
  2The frequent slave raids and the culture of violence attached with it severely damaged the 
security of private property and weakened the judicial system creating a persistent state of 
lawlessness in the society. These weak institutions persisted over time and are continuing to 
affect contemporary development. 
These theories, even though plausible, do not tell us how much of the variation in income 
across the continent they can explain. In order to get a precise answer, one has to check the 
relative strength of these theories in explaining the variation when they are pitted against each 
other in a regression model. 
In this paper we investigate the relative strength of these theories by setting up a simple 
regression model. In the regression model we use log GDP per capita in 2000 as the dependent 
variable and malaria risk, institutions, and total slave exports out of Africa as explanatory 
variables. We deal with the complex causality issues of this strategy by using appropriate 
exogenous instruments for malaria risk, institutions, and total slave exports. The results show that 
malaria matters the most and all other factors are statistically insignificant.  
We explain the mechanism through which malaria impacts African development in two 
stages. First, we show that there is strong negative conditional correlation between malaria and 
savings. Second, by using a two period overlapping generation model we show that malaria 
incidence, which is external to the model, affects development by increasing both mortality and 
morbidity. Increased mortality resulting from malaria induces households to increase current 
consumption and save less for the future. Increased morbidity on the other hand adversely affects 
productivity. This slows down capital accumulation and economic growth.  
Our analysis proceeds in four stages. In section 2, we introduce the empirical model. The 
explanatory variables – malaria risk, institutions, and total slave exports – can be endogenous. It 
can very well be the case that the causality between malaria and per capita income may run in the 
  3opposite direction than what we predict in our model. The same may also happen with institutions 
and total slave exports. In that case the coefficient estimates will be biased. Hence, to correct for 
this problem, we use the instrumental variable strategy. We choose malaria ecology, log settler 
mortality, and distance from the coast as instruments for malaria risk, institutions, and total slave 
exports respectively. Malaria ecology is a geography based measure – correlated with malaria 
incidence but exogenous to the model – which makes it a valid instrument. We follow Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) and use log settler mortality as an instrument for 
institutions. For total slave exports we use distance from the coast as an instrument. This is based 
on the logic that, the further the country from the coast, the smaller will be the number of slaves 
exported from that country. This approach is also followed by Nunn (2004). Further, the use of 
instrumental variable in case of slave exports is also aimed at correcting for measurement error in 
the construction of data for slave exports (Nunn 2004).   
In section 3, we present the empirical results. Malaria risk is the only statistically 
significant variable in our preferred model and it appears to have a large effect on per capita 
income. It also explains the bulk of the variation in per capita income and growth in Africa. This 
result is robust to the choice of additional controls – trade openness, religion, legal origin, 
schooling, ethnic fractionalisation, linguistic fractionalisation, proportion of primary exports in 
1970, and proportion of GDP from mining. However, the result is not robust if alternative 
measures of disease are used.  The result holds when we use yellow fever as an alternative 
measure but does not hold when we use dengue and AIDS as alternatives. This is perhaps 
indicative of the historical importance of malaria in the African development process vis a vis 
other diseases. Even though the problem of AIDS is quite severe in the continent, our regression 
model is not picking up the effect. This is perhaps indicative of the fact that AIDS is a recent 
phenomenon rather than historical.     
  4In section 4, first we present regression results showing strong negative conditional 
correlation between savings and malaria. Then we present the two period overlapping generation 
model and discuss its dynamics. The model unequivocally shows that both mortality and 
morbidity resulting from malaria slows down capital accumulation and economic progress. It also 
shows that high incidence of disease over a long period can result into large scale persistent 
poverty. This implication fits well with our empirical findings highlighting the importance of 
malaria in Africa and what we observe in the continent. 
Finally, section 5 concludes the analysis with some implications. The question that may 
be of interest to a policymaker is that why malaria persists in Africa whereas some other parts of 
the globe managed to overcome the disease. The answer perhaps follows from our model and also 
the regression results. Due to the geographic roots of malaria, fighting the disease is extremely 
costly from the households’ point of view. Eradicating the disease also has huge positive 
externalities which are not internalised by the individual households. Therefore, for a household 
the costs are too high and the benefits are too low. Hence, any meaningful strategy to combat the 
impact of malaria must involve large scale intervention by the state or other international 
organisations which can internalise the cost and distribute the benefits among all households. 
This is precisely what Singapore and the US did in their respective battles against malaria 
and yellow fever. Singapore almost eradicated malaria with a large scale public health 
intervention. The US efforts in building the Panama Canal was backed up by public health 
interventions to fight yellow fever.  
In case of Africa, using state funding in order to fight the disease may not be an option 
due to the thin fiscal resources of a typical African state. The only viable option is international 
aid. Sachs (2005) argues that the aid should be used to fund a large scale development planning 
exercise. Easterly (2006), however, expresses his faith on micro level projects. The issues are 
  5wide open for debate and consensus still eludes us. A more pragmatic approach for the 
policymakers is perhaps to adopt a mix of the two.                
2. The Empirical Strategy 
 The core specification that we estimate in this paper is the following: 
                             log MAL INS SLVX ii i y i i λ αβ γ =+ + + + ε                       (1) 
where i y , MALi, INSi, and SLVXi are per capita income in country i, measure of malaria, 
measure of institutions, and measure of slave exports respectively.  i ε  is the random error term. 
We are interested in the size, sign, and significance of the three coefficients  ,, α β  andγ .  
The estimation of equation (1) is based on a dataset consisting of per capita GDP levels, 
measure of malaria risk, measure of institutions, and measure of slave exports in (up to) 49 
countries in Africa. The definitions and sources for all the variables used in this study is 
summarised in the Data Appendix. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the key variables of 
interest.  
GDP per capita in 2000 data is from the Penn World Table 6.1. According to these 
figures, Tanzania is the poorest country in Africa in 2000. 
Malaria risk is measured by the share of population at risk from malaria in 1997. The 
variable lies between 0 and 1 and a higher value indicates greater risk for the population. Most of 
the countries in the sample registers high malaria incidence except Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.  
Executive constraint in 2000 is used as a measure of institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
2005) also uses executive constraint as a proxy for institutions. The advantage of using this 
measure as a proxy for institutions is that it captures the quality of property rights institutions. 
Higher the degree of institutionalised constraint on the executive, less is the risk of expropriation, 
and hence better is the quality of institutions.    
  6Slave exports data is reconstructed using Nunn (2004) methodology. Nunn (2004) uses 
‘shipping records’ and ‘ethnicity records’ of slaves to construct the cross country series of slave 
exports. The ‘shipping record’ is typically the number of slaves exported to the new world and 
other destinations from African ports. The ‘shipping record’ for the Atlantic Slave trade is 
available from Eltis et al. (1999) CD-ROM and Elbl (1997). Eltis et al. (1999) CD-ROM covers 
the period 1527 to 1866 whereas Elbl (1997) covers the period 1450 to 1521. Data on Indian 
Ocean slave trade is obtained from Austen (1979) for the period before 1769, Martin and Ryan 
(1977) for the period 1770 to1799, and from Austen (1988) for the period 1800 to 1899. Data on 
Trans-Saharan slave trade comes from Austen (1992) and for Red Sea slave trade comes from 
Austen (1988). These figures are also listed in Nunn (2004) data appendix. Nunn also looks at 
several historical records to make a conjecture about the ethnicity and country of origin of these 
slaves. This is what he calls the ‘ethnicity record.’ Ethnicity record gives the information on 
ethnic and country origins of some of the slaves exported to the Americas and other parts during 
this period. Out of this slave sample, Nunn generates estimates of proportional representation of 
each country. He then distributes the sample from ‘shipping records’ to each country using these 
proportions. The information on the proportions is also available from his data appendix. We 
follow the same procedure and end up with a distribution which has a similar ordering as Nunn 
(2004). Nigeria comes out as the highest exporter of slaves. We have to reconstruct the data using 
the exact procedure as Nunn since his data is yet to be published. 
Identifying good empirical proxies for each of these variables is certainly not the difficult 
part of the analysis. The difficulty however lies in sorting out the complex relationship between 
these variables and establishing causality. Anyone would hardly disagree that economic 
development is a complex phenomenon. Given the complex nature of this process, reverse 
causality and indirect effects are a real possibility.  
  7Rather than malaria influencing development the causality may run the other way round. 
The rich economies can afford to invest in the research and development of drugs that cures or 
minimises the effect of malaria. They can also invest in public health programs to destroy 
mosquito habitat and wipe out malaria altogether.  
Similar argument can be made about institutions. Rich nations have better institutions not 
because they have grown richer due to better institutions, but they can afford better institutions. 
Better institutions can also reduce malaria risk via better delivery of public health. 
Indirect effect of slave export on development via institutions is also difficult to rule out. 
Frequent slave raids and the culture of violence may have damaged African institutions in the 
past and these institutions may have persisted over time. 
The other additional problems are measurement error inherent in measuring a variable like 
slave export and unobserved country characteristics systematically influencing one of the 
explanatory variables.  
Nunn (2004) assumes that the slaves exported from a particular port in Africa are coming 
from the country where the port is plus from the close neighbouring countries inland. This 
method always leaves a possibility of under-representation of slaves from inland (Nunn 2004). 
This under-sampling of slaves from the interior will lead to OLS estimates that are biased towards 
zero.
3
It can also be the case that a country chooses slave trade and demonstrates extreme 
reliance on warfare and violence because of some unobserved characteristics inherent in its 
culture. If these characteristics are still persisting, then it is impossible to identify econometrically 
the partial effects of slave trade on its current level of development. The size of the estimates will 
                                                 
3 This is formally known as attenuation bias.  
  8be biased away from zero as the coefficient will account for the unobserved country effect plus 
the true effect of slave trade.  
In order to minimise the effect of reverse causality, indirect effects, measurement error, 
and unobserved country characteristics on our coefficient estimates, we identify instruments for 
each of the suspected endogenous explanatory variables. An instrument is an exogenous source of 
variation which is correlated with the suspected explanatory variable but uncorrelated with the 
error term. This approach of estimation is formally known as the instrumental variable method. 
  Following Sachs (2003) we use malaria ecology as the instrument for malaria risk. This 
measure is ecologically based and built upon climatology and vector conditions on a country by 
country basis, and is therefore exogenous to public health interventions and economic conditions. 
Hence, it can serve as a valid instrument for malaria risk. 
Institutions are instrumented by the largely accepted log settler mortality and log 
population density in 1500 instruments introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. 
(2004). 
Slave export is instrumented by the geography based measure distance from the coast. 
The rational behind using distance from the coast as an instrument is the following. It is expected 
that the higher the distance from the coast, the lower is the volume of slave exports. The obvious 
reason being the cost of capturing and transporting slaves to the coast increases with distance 
(Nunn 2004). 
In an instrumental variable estimation, endogenous explanatory variables are replaced by 
their predicted values from the first stage equations. The first stage equations are as follows. 
               MAL MAL ME LSM LPD DC
i ii i i i μ δχ τ κ ε =+ + + + +                     (2) 
               INS INS LSM LPD ME DC
i ii i i i ϕ ηθσ ν ε =+ + + + +                          (3) 
  9              SLVX SLVX DC ME LSM LPD
i ii i i i ψ ωφπ υ ε =+ + + + +                    (4) 
where MEi, LSMi, LPDi, and DCi refers to malaria ecology, log settler mortality, log population 
density in 1500, and distance from the coast respectively.  
Equations (1) – (4) are at the core of the empirical results that we report in the next 
section. This is perhaps the simplest way that one can deal with so many complex issues 
econometrically. 
3. Results and Robustness 
Panel A of Table 2 reports estimates of the core specification. The first column of panel A 
reports the OLS estimate of the model. Malaria risk is the only statistically significant variable in 
this specification. Executive constraints and slave exports are statistically insignificant. One 
sample standard deviation reduction in malaria risk will result into approximately 1.6 fold 
increase in per capita income. 
The second column of panel A reports the 2SLS estimate. The instruments used are 
malaria ecology, log settler mortality, log population density in 1500, and distance from the coast. 
Qualitatively the result remains the same as the OLS estimate. Malaria risk is the only statistically 
significant variable and executive constraints and slave exports are statistically insignificant. 
However, the magnitude of the coefficient on malaria risk increases. The impact of one standard 
deviation decline in malaria risk on per capita income now becomes 1.7 fold which is bigger than 
what is reported by the OLS estimate.  
These results are indicative of the importance of malaria in Africa. Malaria dominates 
over the other factors when it comes to explaining economic development in Africa. The partial 
correlation coefficients reveal that malaria explains 26.3% of the variation in log per capita 
income in Africa. This however does not mean that the institutions story and the slave export 
  10story have no role. But the presence of malaria as an explanator eclipses the role of the other two 
stories. 
The first stage regressions reported in panel B indicate that the chosen instruments are 
valid. The first column of panel B shows that malaria ecology is correlated with malaria risk. The 
second column shows that both log settler mortality and log population density in 1500 are 
negatively correlated with executive constraints. This makes them valid instruments for 
institutions.
4 Finally, the third column reports negative correlation between distance from the 
coast and log slave exports. It appears that log slave exports is also correlated with malaria 
ecology implying that high malaria incidence made the native African population vulnerable to be 
captured as slaves. Miller (1982) finds similar evidence in Portuguese traveller records, 
missionary and church documents. He argues that frequent epidemics of killer diseases like 
malaria, yellow fever caused massive depopulation in the agriculturally marginal zones of West-
Central Africa and made the local population vulnerable to slave raids.   
The core result is robust to the addition of other control variables in the specification. In 
Table 3 we report the coefficient estimates on malaria risk, executive constraint, and slave export 
when additional control variables are added. Panel A of the table shows that the malaria result 
remains unchanged even when we control for trade openness, religion, legal origin, and 
schooling. In Table 3A we also control for Sachs and Warner (1997) trade openness, ethnic 
fractionalisation, linguistic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, proportion of primary 
exports in 1970, and proportion of GDP from mining. The malaria result holds in all the cases. 
                                                 
4 The direction of the correlation is also in conformity with previous studies by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
Rodrik et al. (2004). 
  11The result also holds when we change the dependent variable to annualised growth rate in per 
capita income over the period 1960 – 2000 (see Table 3, panel A).
5
In panel B of Table 3, we replace malaria with other measures of diseases. The first 
column in panel B shows what happens when we replace malaria with yellow fever. Yellow fever 
is the only statistically significant variable in this specification. The impact of one standard 
deviation reduction in yellow fever will be a 2.6 fold increase in per capita income. Dengue and 
AIDS comes out to be statistically insignificant indicating that they do not affect long-run 
development. Even though yellow fever is statistically significant, it only explains 4.5% of the 
variation in log per capita income.  
In Table 3A we also perform influential observation check using the DFITS formula and 
Cook’s distance suggested by Belsley et al. (1980). The influential observations according to the 
first formula are Equatorial Guinea and Gabon; and according to the second formula are 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and South Africa. Omitting these influential observations from the 
sample does not alter the malaria result. 
The results discussed above show that malaria dominates over institutions and slave 
exports when it comes to explaining long-run economic performance of Africa. However, they do 
not tell us anything about the mechanism through which malaria may impact long term economic 
performance. In order to explore a bit more about the mechanism we adopt the following 
strategies. First, we look at the conditional correlation between national savings and malaria. We 
observe a strong negative relationship between the two. Second, we develop an overlapping 
generation model in which the household face a constant threat of death through malaria. There is 
also an adverse effect on their productivity from the disease. Here also we see a negative 
                                                 












  12relationship between malaria and savings and hence economic growth. This helps us to better 
explain the correlation between malaria and development in Africa.  
3. Exploring the Mechanism through which Malaria Impacts Development 
3.1 Malaria and its Impact on Savings 
To estimate the impact of malaria on savings, we use the following model.  





i ς ϑρ ζ ⎛⎞ =+ + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
                                    (5)  
The results are reported in Table 4. In column 1 of Table 4 we start off with the 
unconditional correlation between malaria and savings rate. The relationship is negative and 
statistically significant when the model is estimated by OLS. A one standard deviation increase in 
malaria risk results into a 5.4 percentage point decline in the savings rate. Column 2 estimates the 
model using 2SLS. The effect remains unaltered in terms of direction and statistical significance. 
However, the magnitude of the effect declines to 4.2 percentage points, that is, 1.2 percentage 
points less than the OLS estimate. In column 3, we add log per capita income as a control. The 
result remains unaltered but the magnitude of the effect becomes bigger than what it was in 
column 2. A one standard deviation increase in malaria risk results into a 5.2 percentage point 
decline in the savings rate in this case. Estimating this model by 2SLS results into a reduction in 
the magnitude of the coefficient however it remains statistically significant and bears a negative 
sign. The magnitude of the impact coefficient in column 4 is 4.3 percentage point.       
3.2 An Overlapping Generation Model with Mortality and Morbidity from Malaria  
Let us consider a perfectly competitive decentralised economy with a single homogeneous 
good for both consumption and production. The households in this economy maximise their 
lifetime expected utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. A typical household 
comprises of both young and old members and each member of the household lives for only two 
  13periods. The young members work in the first period and retire in the second period when they 
are old, and then they die. The members also consume in both periods and the consumption in the 
second period is supported by their savings in the first period. Therefore at each point in time, 
members of only two generations are alive. There is also a positive probability that they die of 
malaria before they reach their old age. The probability of survival into the second period is 
exogenous to the model but depends inversely on unfavourable geography. Unfavourable 
geography is characterised by suitable temperature for mosquito breeding, mosquito species 
abundance, and the availability of malaria transmitting mosquito vector. In order to maintain 
simplicity of the structure, we assume away the possibility of bequests or any altruistic behaviour. 
3.1 Households    
The lifetime utility of a representative household of generation t can be expressed as 
follows. 
                                          1 () () Uu c u c 2 φ =+                                              (5) 
Where  and   are the consumption of generation t when young and old respectively. 
We are also assuming that the household gets zero utility from death and uis concave and twice 
differentiable. 
1 c 2 c
The survival probability φ  of the representative household depends on the unfavourable 
geography vector,  . Γ
6  
                                                    () [ 0 , 1 ] φ φ = ∈ Γ                                        (6) 
Γ is exogenous to the model and shares an inverse relationship withφ .  If  is too high 
then 
Γ
φ can be too low. 
                                                 
6 One argument made by Chakraborty and Das (2005) in a recent paper is that the households can influence 
φ  by investing in health. However, in this case we assume that increase in φ  requires huge investment which is 
often beyond the scope of a private investor or a household. This is reasonably realistic because African malaria is 
predominantly geographic in nature and its reduction would require considerable public health intervention.  
  14The representative individual supplies one unit of labour inelastically when young and 
receives a wage income . Therefore the budget constraint faced by this individual in period t is 
given by the following expression. 
w
                                              1 csw + =                                                    (7) 
Where is the amount of grain saved in period t. The saved grain also grows at a rate 
when planted. Therefore in period t+1the individual consumes the amount saved in period t plus 
the growth in the grains. So the consumption in the second period is as follows. 
s
r
                                           2 cR s =  where  1 R r = +                                 (8) 
Using (8) one can rewrite the budget constraint as  






+ =                                               (9) 
For analytical convenience we assume that 
                                            
1










                                  (10) 
Each households treat  and w R as given and maximises their lifetime utility subject to the 
budget constraint. This yields the following Euler equation. 








σ φ =                                             (11) 
Also from the first order conditions we get  





















                         (12) 
3.2 Production 
Every period the economy produces a single good which can be consumed or invested. 
The output is produced using physical capital K and labourL . The production technology 
  15(,) FKL θ is neoclassical in nature and satisfies the Inada conditions. The parameter θ  is less than 
1 and is indicative of the morbidity effects of malaria. Due to morbidity of labour the economy 
cannot operate at the frontier of its production technology. It always underperforms. θ  is also 
negatively dependent on . If geography is too unfavourable then  Γ θ   is extremely low.   
Under these conditions, in competitive product and factor markets, the economy wide 
wage and interest rates are: 





= . For simplicity, we assume no depreciation of capital. 
3.3 Dynamics 
Aggregate savings in period t is used as aggregate capital stock for production in period 
t+1 in this economy. Assuming logarithmic preferences (1 ) σ =  and Cobb-Douglas production 
technology, we get the dynamic equation of the economy as  












                                                      (14) 
At steady state   and therefore the steady state level of capital stock is given 
by the following: 
*
1 tt kk k + ==










= ⎢ ++ ⎣⎦
⎤
⎥                                                      (15) 
From the above expression we can see that a low probability of survival (φ ) into the 
second period and a low value of θ  results into a low level of steady state capital stock. In other 
words, high mortality and morbidity due to unfavourable geography results into a steady state 
with very low level of capital stock. This certainly fits well with what we observe in the data. The 
  16strong correlation between malaria and the level of development in Africa may very well be due 
to low θ and lowφ .   
The only way to improve living standard in this economy in the long-run is to reduce 
mortality and morbidity.
7 In order to reduce mortality and morbidity, one has to reverse the trend 
of unfavourable geography.
8 The cost of this is prohibitively high for the household and far 
outweighs the benefit. Another obstacle is that the household cannot internalise the positive 
externalities of reversing unfavourable geography. In that situation one may argue that 
intervention by the state is perhaps the right thing to do, provided the state has necessary fiscal 
resources. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we construct a regression model to estimate the historical contributions of 
malaria, colonial institutions, and slave trade in Africa’s underdevelopment. The estimation result 
shows that malaria explains more than one fourth of the variation within Africa. The other 
explanators are statistically insignificant and are at the best weak in presence of malaria. The 
result is robust to the choice of additional control variables such as trade, religion, legal origin, 
schooling, trade policy, reliance on mining, reliance on primary products export, ethnic 
fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, and linguistic fractionalisation. Replacing malaria 
with other diseases does not appear to have the same explanatory power as malaria. Yellow fever 
is the only other disease that comes out to be statistically significant. However, it only explains 
less than 5% of the variation in log per capita income. 
We also use a regression model showing strong and negative conditional correlation 
between malaria and savings and a two period overlapping generation model to explain the 
                                                 
7 Technology can also be a source of long-run growth. But it is not modeled explicitly here.  
8 Reversing unfavourable geography is used synonymously as large investments in public health.    
  17mechanism through which malaria impacts long-run development. The model shows that malaria 
impacts economic development through mortality and morbidity. High mortality rate induces 
households to save less for the second period of life. This hinders capital accumulation. 
Morbidity on the other hand reduces labour productivity and hence household income. This has a 
negative income effect on household savings and capital accumulation. In the face of high 
malaria incidence and death from malaria, the economy remains trapped in a low level 
equilibrium. The model predicts that the only way out of this is large scale investments in public 
health. 
Finally, the obvious question for a policymaker who would like to improve the 
performance of the African economies is how much guidance these results provide for her? The 
answer is a reasonable amount when they are put into the right perspective. Economic history 
literature documents that malaria and other vector borne diseases such as yellow fever has always 
been a problem not only in Africa but also in other tropical regions of the globe (Spielman and 
D’Antonio (2001), Dias (1981)). However, the question remains why it has persisted for so long 
in Africa whereas some other tropical parts of the globe recovered from it.
9 The answer lies in a 
systematic and successful public health intervention which never took place in Africa. One of the 
possible reasons why it never took place in Africa is the thin fiscal resources of most of the 
African governments. In a situation of widespread poverty and underdevelopment, taxing the 
households in order generate more funds for public health intervention may not be an option as it 
will aggravate the situation. It will also create an environment of conflict and political instability. 
                                                 
9 A good example of recovery is Singapore which was a high malaria risk country until recently. This was 
made possible by large scale investments by the government in health. Similar situation arose in Panama in 1904 
when the US wanted to build the canal. The mortality rate of the workforce was extremely high from yellow fever. 
The project was completed with the help of a major public health intervention supported by the then US government 
(Spielman and D’Antonio 2001).     
  18Therefore, the only feasible option is to create international donor generated funds in order to 
eradicate the disease.  
Sachs (2005) argues in favour of a large scale development planning in Africa funded by 
the international donors to eradicate malaria from the continent. The root of his idea goes back to 
the ‘Big Push’ recommendations made in the 1950s and 1960s in development economics. These 
ideas are not free from their problems. As Easterly (2006) points out that a ‘Big Push’ style 
planning exercise is unable to solve the inherent incentive problems with its implementation. 
According to him micro level projects which take into account the incentive problems will 
perhaps work better. This however does not take into account the time costs of disbursing aid in a 
micro planning framework. Micro planning framework can be extremely slow to deliver and one 
can raise questions about long-term viability of such projects. Therefore, a more pragmatic 
approach has to be a mix of the two keeping in mind the needs of the local population. This also 
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Table 2. Malaria and African Development: Core Results 
Panel A: The Model 
λ αβ γ ε =+ + + + 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000  Dependent Variable 
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Panel B: The First Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variables  Malaria Risk (MALi) 
obs= 31 
Executive Constraints in 
2000 (INSi) 
obs= 31 
Log total slave exports per 
square km (SLVXi) 
obs= 31 
Malaria Ecology (MEi) 
 
Log Settler Mortality 
(LSMi) 
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(0.0410) 
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0.19*** 
(0.0482) 










9.99              
       Notes:  ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The standard errors reported in the 
regressions are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. 












 Table 3. Malaria and African Development: Robustness Check (2SLS Estimates) 
Panel A: The Model 
log MAL INS SLVX OTH CTRL ii i i i i y λ αβ γ ξ ε = ++ + + +    
Log per Capita GDP in 2000   Growth in Per 
Capita GDP 
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Panel B: Robustness with Other Diseases 
Log per Capita GDP in 2000  Dependent variable 
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Average Dengue in 





in 2000 (INSi) 
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-0.31    
(0.4427)               
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective 
standard errors. The instruments used are ME, LSM, LPD, and DC. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are 
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Table 3A. Additional Robustness Check (2SLS Estimates) 
The Model 
log MAL INS SLVX OTH CTRL ii i i i i y λ αβ γ ξ ε = ++ + + +  
Log per Capita GDP in 2000  Dependent 
variable  obs = 31  obs = 31  obs = 30  obs = 31  obs = 27  obs = 31  DFITS 
obs = 30 
Cook’s Distance 














-1.54***   
(0.5686) 
 





0.028   
(0.0648)     









(0.0661)         









(0.0714)         
-1.51**   





      
 
  0.014   
(0.0721)      
-1.88***   
(0.2459) 





      
.022 
(0.0345)      
-1.76***   
(0.4258) 
     





0.047   
(0.0461)       
-1.49***   
(0.4113) 
 





0.012    
(0.0459)        
-1.31**   
(0.5547) 
     
0.02    




0.037    










Exports in 1970 




--  --  --  --  --  --  GNQ, GAB  GNQ, GAB, 
ZAF 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective 
standard errors. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. Influential observations are 
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  28Data Appendix 
Variable name  Description  Source 
Log Per Capita GDP 
in 2000 (  )    log i y
Natural log of real GDP per capita in 
2000. Real GDP figures are measured 
in US $ in current prices and the 
figures are PPP converted. For 
Botswana, Mauritania and Namibia 
we use 1999 values as an 
approximation. For Central African 
Republic I use 1998 values. For 
Angola, Zaire, and Sudan I use log 
per capita GDP (PPP adjusted and 
measured in current US$) from World 
Development Indicator (WDI). 
Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Growth in Per Capita 
GDP in (1960-2000)    
 




ii i yy y ≡− )  for 46 
African countries.  
Penn World Table (PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Executive Constraints 
in 2000 (INSi) 
 
A seven category scale, 1 to 7, with a 
higher score indicating more 
constraint.  
Polity IV dataset 
Malaria Risk (MALi)  Percentage of the population at risk of 
malaria transmission in 1994. 
Centre for International Development 
(CID), Geography Datasets, Harvard 
University 
Log total slave 
exports per square km 
(SLVXi) 
This is natural log of the normalised 
estimate of total number of slaves 
exported from Africa during the 
period 1400-1899. The number of 
slave exports are normalised by the 
country size. The figure includes the 
Atlantic slave exports, the Indian 
ocean slave exports, the Trans 
Saharan slave exports, and the Red 
sea slave exports. I use Nunn (2004)’s 
methodology outlined in its data 
appendix to back out the numbers. 
The other sources that I have used 
following Nunn (2004) is Elbl (1997); 
Eltis et al. (1999); Austen (1979); 
Austen (1988); and Austen (1992). I 
have divided each of these numbers 
by the corresponding country size 
measured in km
2. The country size 
data is from CID geography dataset.   
Nunn (2004) 
Log Settler Mortality 
(LSMi) 
Natural log of  estimated European 
Settler Mortality Rate in colonies and 
settlements 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
 
Log population 
Density in 1500 
(LPDi) 
Log of total population divided by 
total arable land in 1500 A.D. Source: 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) as cited in 
Acemoglu, et al. (2002). 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) 
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Malaria Ecology 
(MEi) 
Malaria Ecology (ME) pop-weighted, 
Sept 2003 version. This variable 
provides an instrument for malaria risk 
that controls for the fact that causation 
may run not only from malaria to 
income but also from income to 
malaria. The basic formula for ME 
includes temperature, species 
abundance, and vector type (the type 
of mosquito). The underlying index is 
measured on a highly disaggregated 
sub-national level, and then is 
averaged for the entire country. 
Because ME is built upon 
climatological and vector conditions 
on a country-by-country basis, it is 
exogenous to public health 
interventions and economic 
conditions.  
Kiszewski et al. (2004) 
Distance from the 
coast (DCi) 
Mean distance to nearest coastline 
measured in kilometres.    
Centre for International Development, 
Geography Datasets  
Catholicism  Identifies the percentage of population 
of each country being Catholic in 
1980. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Islam  Identifies the percentage of population 
of each country being Muslim in 1980. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Log of Trade Share in 
2000 
Natural log of Trade share calculated 
by taking log values of figure obtained 
by dividing volume of trade with GDP  
WDI Online, The World Bank Group  
Legal Origin (British)  Legal origin of the Company Law or 
Commercial Code of each country. 
The English Common Law dummy. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Legal Origin (French)  Legal origin of the Company Law or 
Commercial Code of each country. 
The French Civil Law dummy. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) 
Total Years of 
Schooling in 2000 
Average schooling years in the total 
population in 2000. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Yellow Fever Risk in 
1996 
Percentage of population living in 
areas with yellow fever (% country 
area), 1996; calculated in equal area 
cylindrical projection. 
Centre for International Development, 
Geography Datasets, Harvard 
University  
Average Dengue in 
1975 – 1995 
Percentage of population living in 
areas with dengue fever (Percentage 
country area), 1975 to 1995. 
Calculated in equal-area cylindrical 
projection. WHO. 1995. “Key Issues 
in Dengue Vector Control Toward the 
Operationalization of a Global 
Strategy.” Geneva: WHO. Page 4. 
Centre for International Development, 
Geography Datasets, Harvard 
University 
AIDS  Number of AIDS incidents per 
100,000 people.  
United Nations Statistics Division, 2001 
Ethnic 
Fractionalisation  
Probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belongs 
to different ethnic groups.  
Alesina et al. (2003) 
  30Variable name  Description  Source 
Linguistic 
Fractionalisation  
Probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belongs 
to different language groups.  
Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious 
Fractionalisation  
Probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population belongs 
to different religious groups.  
Alesina et al. (2003) 
SWOPEN The  proportion  of years that a country 
is open to trade during 1965-90, by the 
criteria defined by Sachs and Warner 
(1995).  
Sachs and Warner (1995) 
Primary Export in 
1970 
Share of exports of primary products 
in GNP in 1970. 
Sachs and Warner (1997) 
Mining  Fraction of GDP in Mining  Hall and Jones (1999) 
Gross Savings as 







This is gross national savings as a 
percentage of GDP in 2001. 
WDI Online, The World Bank Group  
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